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NONMARKET STRATEGY PERFORMANCE:  
EVIDENCE FROM U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of ‘political markets’ – 
where firms transact over public policies with government policy-makers – we 
develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms’ nonmarket 
strategies. We propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy 
outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians; the 
firm’s recent experience with policy-makers; and the opportunity to learn from 
other firms’ recent experiences; and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from 
competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies. Using 
data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of U.S. 
privately-owned electric utilities over a 13 year period, we find empirical support 
for our arguments.  
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Although the last decade has witnessed increased interest in the design and implementation of 
firms’ nonmarket strategies – defined as the coordinated actions firms undertake in public policy 
arenas (Baron, 2003; Baysinger, 1984; Hillman et al., 2004; Shaffer, 1995) – extant research has 
remained relatively silent regarding the actual performance of such strategies. By performance, 
we mean the ability of firms to effect favorable public policy decisions. For instance, firms may 
seek legislative or regulatory support for specific environmental emissions standards, import 
tariff policies, anti-trust decisions or regulated rates. Relative to a given status quo policy, 
performance measures the ability of a firm to achieve policy either closer to, or to block 
proposals that move policy further from, its preferred position. Considerable attention has been 
paid to firms’ decisions regarding investments in, and the structure of, nonmarket strategies 
(Bonardi, 2004; de Figuereido and Tiller, 2001; Grier et al, 1994; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2002, 2004; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Lenway and Rehbein, 1991; 
Schuler, 1996; Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer, 2002). Despite these studies, however, little 
analysis has directly examined the determinants of actual performance (Keim and Baysinger, 
1988). As Getz notes in a survey, “if political action is ever to be fully integrated with strategic 
planning and organizational behavior (intellectually or practically), much more empirical work 
on effectiveness will need to be done” (1997: 64). Our objective in this paper is thus to extend the 
current literature by exploring, both theoretically and empirically, nonmarket strategy 
performance.  
A natural question is why the academic literature has produced so little investigation into the 
issue of performance. After all, this is a critical managerial issue. We advance two explanations. 
At a theoretical level, the field has until recently lacked a unifying conceptual framework that 
analyzes the determinants of nonmarket strategy performance (Lord, 2000). Recent scholarship, 
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however, has proposed a framework of ‘political markets’ where interactions of demanders 
(firms, consumers, unions, activists, etc.) and suppliers (government policy-makers) shape public 
policies (Bonardi et al., 2005). In this view, suppliers such as legislators implicitly trade votes on 
legislative bills in return for electorally-valuable resources such as campaign contributions. In a 
spirit similar to Porter’s structural industry analysis (Porter, 1980), the framework assesses the 
inherent attractiveness of operating in different types of political markets. Structural 
characteristics such as rivalry among demanders or suppliers make political markets more or less 
attractive from a firm’s perspective – thereby influencing the firm’s decision to engage in 
nonmarket strategies.  
Here, we utilize and build on the political markets framework to develop theoretically- 
grounded predictions regarding the performance of firm nonmarket strategy. In particular, we 
extend the framework to incorporate other institutional suppliers of public policies: regulatory 
agencies, which have responsibility for designing and implementing policies (Weidenbaum, 
2003). Since agency objectives are not necessarily aligned with those of elected politicians, firms 
may need to adapt their nonmarket strategies when interacting mainly with regulatory agencies.  
We expand the political markets approach also by exploring how firm-specific capabilities 
affect nonmarket performance. Several authors, building on the resource-based view, have 
suggested that firms’ internal processes, resources and knowledge related to political activities 
are unevenly distributed among firms, and that firms with such nonmarket capabilities should be 
more effective in influencing public policies (Baron, 2003; Keim and Baysinger, 1988; Dean and 
Brown, 1995; Hillman et al., 2004). Here, we build on this general proposition in the context of 
the political markets framework and develop specific hypotheses relating nonmarket capabilities 
to performance.  
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The second reason for the paucity of work on nonmarket strategy performance, we speculate, 
stems from the difficulty of obtaining data both on the structure of firms’ nonmarket strategies 
and on their performance impact on a particular policy issue. Existing studies have investigated 
the impact of nonmarket activities using highly aggregated measures of firms’ performance such 
as corporate financial profitability (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Shaffer, Quasney 
and Grimm, 2000). Here, we overcome the resulting identification and measurement challenges 
by using rich information on U.S. electric utilities’ nonmarket stategies. We construct a panel 
dataset that includes specific measures of the performance of firm nonmarket strategy – in this 
case regulatory agency decisions on the financial rate of return that U.S. electric utilities may 
earn – and a precise identification of the firm’s decision to implement a nonmarket strategy – the 
utility’s decision to file a formal request with the regulatory agency to change its rates. Using 
this novel dataset, we find support for the validity of the political markets framework, including 
firm-specific capabilities, in determining the performance of firms’ nonmarket strategies.  
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. In the next, we briefly lay out the 
theoretical foundations for an integrative analysis of nonmarket performance based on the 
concept of political market attractiveness. Following that, we develop specific hypotheses 
regarding firm nonmarket strategy performance. The third section provides a test of our 
hypotheses using data on U.S. electric utilities’ rate reviews during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The fourth and fifth sections present and discuss the results. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In understanding the factors that drive nonmarket strategy performance we find it helpful to 
draw an analogy with the competitive strategy literature. Scholars have argued that firm 
performance is either correlated with industry attractiveness (Porter, 1980; McGahan and Porter, 
5 
 
1997) or with the firm’s distinctive capabilities (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
Here, we draw a similar distinction between external and internal drivers of performance, which 
we now discuss in turn.  
Political markets and firms’ nonmarket performance 
Research in economics and political science has argued that a firm’s political environment 
can be characterized as a marketplace where demanders – firms, interest groups, unions, 
consumers, activists, etc.- and suppliers - elected politicians, regulatory agencies and courts - 
transact over public policies. Originally developed in the 1960s, the political markets approach 
challenged the common axiom in the economics literature that government institutions adopt and 
implement public policies in the “public interest” (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Stigler, 1971). 
Instead, politicians exchange policy favors for resources from organized interest groups in order 
to maximize their electoral prospects. Valuable resources include votes from supporting interest 
groups or other resources, such as financial resources and information, which can indirectly 
influence election outcomes (Mueller, 2003). Since most voters remain rationally ignorant about 
policy details due to the costs of becoming fully informed, politicians have some scope to trade 
policies that deviate from the “public interest” (Aranson, 1990). The implication is that firms, 
through the appropriate implementation of nonmarket strategies, are able to influence policy-
makers’ decisions. Figure 1 provides a representation of a political market involving a focal firm 
that wishes to influence a particular public policy.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The objectives of the suppliers – such as election for politicians in democratic institutional 
systems – shape the types of resources that are valuable in the political marketplace (Hillman and 
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Keim, 1995). In democratic institutional systems, for example, politicians value votes and the 
resources that generate votes. Demanders, including firms, who are able to provide these 
resources have an opportunity to gain more favorable policy decisions. Firms design nonmarket 
strategies, either individually or in concert with other firms or groups, to effectively participate in 
political markets, providing votes, for instance, through constituency building; financial support, 
such as campaign contributions; and information regarding policy consequences and alternatives 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Bonardi, Hillman and Keim (2005) examine the conditions under 
which the demand and supply sides of the political market for a specific issue will be attractive 
from a firm’s perspective. This approach provides an overall framework for us to study the 
factors that drive the performance of firms’ nonmarket strategies. 
Political markets and the role of regulatory agencies 
While the political markets approach has spurred research streams in both the economics and 
strategic management literatures (Bonardi, Hillman and Keim, 2005; de Figueiredo and 
Silverman (forthcoming), a shortcoming to date has been the relative neglect of the ‘supply-
side’, and especially the role played by regulatory agencies. Much of the existing literature 
examines how firms or organized interest groups design campaign contribution strategies aimed 
at securing the support of elected legislators in the legislative process – to propose, modify or 
veto legislative bills. In many industries, however, expert agencies have primary responsibility 
for designing and implementing public policies through administrative regulations. They are also 
prohibited from accepting financial resources from the firms they regulate. Furthermore, agency 
motivations are typically not dictated by the ballot box since agency heads are usually appointed 
by executives or legislatures. Such factors suggest that agency decisions can have important 
consequences for many firms and that agencies may behave differently from elected political 
7 
 
institutions. From the firm’s perspective, then, designing nonmarket strategies to interface with 
regulatory agencies presents different challenges from those targeted at elected politicians 
(Baron, 2001). One contribution of this article therefore will be to better integrate agencies into 
the political markets framework and to develop hypotheses regarding how agencies affect the 
performance of a firm’s nonmarket strategy. 
Political markets and firms’ nonmarket capabilities 
Another limitation of the political markets framework as developed to date relates to the 
existence of distinctive nonmarket capabilities within firms. In much research, especially 
empirical studies, nonmarket capabilities have been excluded, implicitly treating firms as 
homogenous entities (Hillman et al., 2004). Following the resource-based view of the firm, 
however, several researchers have argued that an important component of nonmarket strategies 
and of their performance lies in firms’ internal nonmarket capabilities (Baron, 2003; Dean and 
Brown, 1995; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Vietor, 1994). Nonmarket capabilities consist of tacit and 
non-tacit knowledge and skills that enable firms to manage the public policy process and to 
achieve favorable legislative, executive, administrative and judicial policy outcomes.  
 The significance of nonmarket capabilities as a determinant of nonmarket performance has 
also not been clearly articulated. Here, we argue that nonmarket capabilities are particularly 
important in explaining heterogeneity among firms’ nonmarket performance since political 
markets exhibit high transaction costs – factors that impede the specification, monitoring or 
enforcement of transactions (Dixit, 1996). As North comments, “ political markets are 
characterized by imperfect information, subjective models and high transaction costs. (...) The 
political market has been, and continues to be, one in which the actors have an imperfect 
understanding of the issues affecting them and equally in which the high costs of transacting 
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prevent the achievement of efficient solutions,” (North, 1990: 357). Given the prohibition on 
explicit contracts between special interest groups and politicians – and hence on judicial 
enforcement – the risks of opportunism and market failure are high (Dixit, 1996: 53). It is in this 
context that nonmarket capabilities play a key role. Firms that develop the ability to sustain 
‘trade’ in political markets – especially by developing credible reputations (Eggertson, 1993) – 
can overcome these intrinsic barriers and more successfully implement nonmarket strategies.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We now build on the political markets framework presented above to develop hypotheses on 
the determinants of a firm’s nonmarket strategy performance. We focus our arguments around 
four key factors: the degree of rivalry among demanders; the degree of rivalry among politicians; 
the resource base of the regulatory authority; and finally the nonmarket capabilities of the focal 
firm.  
Demand-side: interest groups 
 Mueller (2003: 472) argues that “politics in the modern democratic state is not a 
confrontation between two polarized economic classes, but rather a struggle among a plethora 
of groups with divergent interests”. Firms, in developing nonmarket strategies, may face 
opposition from several types of ‘demanders’ in the market for public policies (Mahon, 1993). 
First, other firms, either market rivals or within the broader industry structure, may be 
disadvantaged, either absolutely or relatively, by the regulatory changes proposed by the focal 
firm. Competing firms that are politically organized either individually or in industry 
associations can generate high levels of rivalry (Stigler, 1971). As an example, during 2005 
Walmart proposed an increase to the minimum wage. This policy change would have 
asymmetrically affected rivals in the retail industry, as Walmart's average wage paid to 
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employees was significantly higher than the current minimum wage while their rival's average 
wage was much closer to the extant minimum wage. This generated significant lobbying 
pressures by rivals against Walmart’s proposal.1 
Second, consumers of the firm’s products or services can also pose a threat by demanding 
public policies that lower rates or increase costs through new quality, environmental, safety or 
other standards. While the costs of collective action are typically substantial for individual 
consumers, those that are sufficiently large or that can obtain public funds, can organize against 
the firm in policy arenas (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2006; Olson, 1965). A third type of 
nonmarket competition stems from interest groups such as unions or environmental activists. 
Recent scholarship argues these actors can be tough opponents for firms since a common 
strategy has been to mobilize the media which, by providing new information to otherwise 
uninformed voters, enables them to alter public perceptions on policy issues (Bonardi and Keim, 
2005). By making issues more politically salient, these interest groups can exert powerful 
pressure on politicians and appointed bureaucrats. Again, Walmart is an interesting example as 
many activists and unions have taken actions to push communities to oppose or slow down, 
sometimes successfully, the opening of Walmart superstores throughout the U.S.  
As opposed interest groups compete more vigorously against the firm for their preferred 
policies, policy-makers’ bargaining positions improve, enabling them to demand more in return 
for policy favors – for example, in the form of greater electoral campaign contributions or 
grassroots mobilization (Keim and Baysinger, 1988). The performance or effectiveness of firms’ 
nonmarket expenditures in achieving favorable policy outcomes will thus be reduced in such 
environments. This leads to our first hypothesis:  
                                                   
1
 See “Trouble in Walmart’s America”, The Washington Post, October 26, 2005. 
10 
 
Hypothesis 1: Rivalry from competing interest groups is negatively related to the 
performance of a firm’s nonmarket strategy. 
Supply-side: elected politicians 
Competitive rivalry for public policies exists not only in the demand-side but also the supply-
side of the market place. Recent research suggests that elected politicians are more receptive to 
interest group demands for regulatory favors when electoral competition or rivalry is stronger 
(Ansolabehere et al, 2003). Greater rivalry between electoral candidates or party coalitions 
makes candidates more willing to ‘trade’ policy favors in return for campaign contributions or 
other forms of valuable support that maximize their chances of election (Baron, 2001). U.S. steel 
producers, for instance, substantially increased their lobbying of the Bush administration in 2002 
in order to obtain a tariff on steel imports. One factor that strengthened their bargaining power 
was the existence of extremely tight competition between Republican and Democrat candidates 
for House seats in several steel oriented states. Ultimately, in the months before the election, 
Bush implemented a 30% tariff.2 Naturally, this willingness to trade policy favors is conditioned 
by the broader public saliency of the relevant policies – trading policy with organized interests 
can come at the expense of electoral votes if the issue is of particular concern to voters (Bonardi 
and Keim, 2005). For less salient policies, firms may press for policy support in the form of new 
legislation (or amendments to existing chamber bills) or in the oversight of regulatory agencies.  
On the other hand, when a political party or coalition has a powerful hold on office through a 
large and sustained electoral majority – and hence reduced demand for additional support from 
special interests – firms are less able to sway policy outcomes from the incumbent party’s 
preferred position. Firms, who tend to be better politically organized than other interest groups 
                                                   
2
 See The Politics of Steel, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk,  March 6, 2002. 
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(Stigler, 1971), will thus experience a more favorable policy environment when political rivalry 
increases. 
Hypothesis 2: Rivalry between politicians is positively related to the performance of a 
firm’s nonmarket strategy. 
Supply-side: regulatory agencies 
While elected politicians decide the broad characteristics of public policies, specific details, 
day-to-day implementation, monitoring and enforcement activities are delegated to regulatory 
agencies in most jurisdictions. Since a high degree of information is typically required to specify 
and implement detailed policies, agencies are one organizational mechanism for developing 
sustained policy expertise. From a firm’s perspective, regulatory agencies, rather than 
legislatures or executives, are thus often the central point of contact in responding to the 
requirements of public policies that regulate their businesses (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2004).  
We argue here that the environmental conditions that enable firms to successfully gain the 
support of regulatory agencies are quite different from those in legislative and executive arenas. 
These stem from the different incentives and constraints that the two types of institutions operate 
within. Regulators are typically appointed rather than elected so they do not face the election 
constraint that can motivate elected politicians’ behaviors. Existing research suggests that 
regulators’ objective functions are especially multi-dimensional: regulators may try to maximize 
the budget of their offices (Niskanen, 1971), expand the number of personnel employed or 
enhance their career prospects or political reputation (Mueller, 2003; Niskanen, 1971; 
Weatherby, 1971; Weber, 1947). Since achievement of these objectives depends on the 
legitimacy that regulators hold within the institutional system, a meta-objective of regulators is to 
preserve or increase their legitimacy (Majone, 1996). To do so, regulators adhere to the 
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procedural constraints that govern their decision-making and which are designed to ensure that 
regulators implement policies in accordance with the broad wishes of the enabling legislators 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Weingast and Moran, 1983). Procedural requirements relate to 
the informational basis of regulatory decisions: agencies generally must obtain information from 
affected parties, base their final decisions on the evidence presented and publicly announce, 
along with their rationale, proposed policy changes (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987; 
1989).  
While such informational requirements enable legislative committees and executives to 
monitor agency behavior and to prevent arbitrary decisions, they also create a resource 
dependency relationship between the agency and regulated firms (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Pfeffer 1981, 1992). In particular, regulators depend on firms and other interested parties to 
provide valuable information during regulatory hearings (Mueller, 2003). A regulatory agency 
uses this information as evidence in support of its proposals. Without substantiation of its policy 
ruling, an agency would risk being overturned by the courts, generating an important loss of 
legitimacy. The European Commission, for example, suffered such a loss in 2002 when three of 
its decisions against the mergers of private companies were voided by the European Court of 
Justice. The Court found that the economic analyses of the mergers’ anticompetitive effects were 
based on insufficient evidence. These decisions questioned the authority of the Commission – 
and of its head Mario Monti – and led to its reform in 2003.3 Agencies with larger budgets and 
greater expertise are thus better positioned to independently obtain their own information, assess 
the firms’ arguments and to counter firms’ policy proposals (Oliver, 1991). Lesser resourced 
agencies, on the other hand, will be more dependent on the information provided by firms in 
formulating their decisions, lending a natural bias towards the firm. It follows that the greater the 
                                                   
3
 See for instance “Mario Monti’s Parallel Universe”, Financial Times, November 6, 2002. 
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regulatory authority’s resources, the less dependent the agency on the firm and the more difficult 
or costly it becomes for the firm to obtain favorable agency decisions. Hence:  
Hypothesis 3: The resource base of the relevant regulatory agency is negatively related 
to the performance of a firm’s nonmarket strategy. 
Nonmarket capabilities  
 As argued earlier, the political market framework provides one explanation for why 
nonmarket capabilities are particularly important in explaining firm nonmarket performance. 
Compared to economic markets, political markets suffer from relatively high transaction costs 
which, we argue, create a critical advantage for firms that have developed capabilities to mitigate 
them. Transaction costs in political markets arise, in large part, from the potential opportunism of 
demanders and suppliers. While parties may strike an agreement, the impossibility of or 
uncertainty surrounding judicial enforcement makes it difficult for the parties to credibly commit 
to implement or to maintain a deal (Dixit, 1996; North, 1990; Russo, 1992).  
The existence of transaction costs does not mean, however, that all firms will be affected 
similarly. We argue that firms that repeatedly interact with government policy-makers will gain 
an advantage in sustaining trade in political markets in two ways. First, existing research shows 
that the development of mutual trust, reputation and cooperation are central mechanisms in 
solving commitment problems (Dyer, 1997; Fukuyama, 1996; Hill, 1990; Jones, 1995). Such 
attributes come from repeated interactions among demanders and suppliers (Williamson, 1994). 
Firms that frequently engage with the government thus have a chance to build trust-worthy 
reputations. Second, an important by-product of repeated interactions is the opportunity for firms 
to learn from experience and to develop specific capabilities that improve their performance in 
these types of environments (Dean and Brown, 1995). Direct experiences with politicians and 
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regulators enable firms to better understand the patterns of behavior and preferences of policy-
makers (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2002; Ring, Lenway and Govekar, 1990). Some of these 
capabilities become embedded within managers and employees who are able to leverage their 
individual experiences. Others become embedded within firms’ operating routines; firms 
establish codified and uncodified practices that reflect prior managerial approaches to resolving 
these issues (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Keim and Baysinger, 1988). Such capabilities enable 
firms to alleviate transaction costs and to more effectively implement nonmarket strategies. 
Hence:  
Hypothesis 4: The firm’s experience in dealing with government policy-makers is 
positively related to the performance of a firm’s nonmarket strategy.  
Another important dimension of transaction costs in political markets is related to the low 
levels of transaction frequency (Kaufman et al., 1993). Policy issues affecting a particular firm 
typically come onto the political agenda only rarely (Kingdon, 1984). This implies that political 
markets are often discontinuous: interactions among demanders and suppliers take place 
intensively for a limited period of time, and then disappear for a much longer period. In that 
context, mitigating transaction costs through intensive and repeated interaction is often not an 
available option.  
However, we argue here that this characteristic renders important another way by which 
firms can develop transaction cost-mitigating capabilities: by learning from other firms’ 
experience in similar nonmarket settings. Studies on technological innovation and geographic 
expansion strategies, for example, find that firms learn from other firms in the same industry 
(Baum et al., 2000; Jacobson, 1992; Macher and Henisz, 2004). A similar mechanism may 
enable firms to develop transaction cost-mitigating capabilities in political markets. Some of the 
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heterogeneity among firms’ nonmarket performance is therefore likely to stem from whether 
they have been able to learn from others’ experiences. This leads to the following:  
Hypothesis 5: The firm’s opportunity to learn from other firms’ interactions with 
government policy-makers is positively related to the performance of a firm’s nonmarket 
strategy. 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Industry Setting 
Before discussing our empirical approach, we briefly outline the regulatory and political 
environment of our selected industry, and some of the reasons why it provides a good setting for 
examining nonmarket strategy. In order to test our hypotheses, we focus on the case of 
nonmarket strategy in the U.S. electric utility sector. Profit levels of utilities are regulated under 
a financial rate-of-return regime by state agencies; utilities are able to improve their financial 
performance by achieving – through appropriate nonmarket strategies – a higher rate-of-return. 
State regulatory agencies (Public Utility Commissions, hereafter “PUCs”) determine the rate-of-
return that a utility is allowed to earn, and hence the final rates charged to consumers, through an 
administrative process, commonly termed a “rate review”. Utilities are able to file for rate 
reviews whenever they wish. Upon initiation of a rate review, a series of public hearings is held 
where the utility and competing interest groups present arguments and information supporting 
their positions about justifiable rates-of-return and rate levels. At the end of this process, PUC 
commissioners make a final decision on the rate-of-return for the utility and rates that final 
consumers pay.  
The rate review process is characterized by an intense informational exchange between 
policy-makers, the utility and other interest groups (Hyman, 2000). Since the provision of 
information regarding policy consequences and alternatives is a central characteristic of 
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nonmarket strategy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), the utility’s initiation of a rate review is a clear 
indication of the implementation of such a strategy. At the same time, utilities are likely to 
engage in other nonmarket activities that complement their regulatory filing with the agency, 
such as gaining the support of the state governor and legislature (through lobbying, grassroots 
mobilization, coalition building and financial campaign contributions).4 
This industry context affords a number of advantages for our empirical investigation. First, 
we are able to identify when firms engage in a concerted nonmarket strategy by observing when 
utilities file formal regulatory requests for rate reviews. By using regulatory filings we adopt the 
approach of other nonmarket strategy studies. Lenway and Rehbein (1991) and Schuler (1996) 
consider, for instance, the decision by firms to file with the U.S. International Trade Commission 
in order to obtain trade protection.  
Another advantage of using electric utility rate reviews for our empirical setting is that they 
provide a good measure of the performance of the firm’s nonmarket strategy (our dependent 
variable). As noted earlier, the lack of sufficiently detailed data has hindered management 
researchers in empirically studying the performance aspect of nonmarket strategies. As part of 
their final rate review rulings, PUCs determine the financial rate-of-return on equity (hereafter 
‘ROR’) that the utility may earn, and which is used in determining allowed rate levels. Since, all 
else equal, higher RORs lead to higher profits, utilities prefer higher RORs. While PUCs have a 
statutory duty to set rates that are “just and reasonable”, in practice they have considerable 
discretion to set rates and RORs within some implicit range.5 Utilities that design effective 
nonmarket strategies may thus achieve higher RORs than otherwise. We therefore use the ROR 
                                                   
4
 Data on state-level electoral campaign contributions from www.followthemoney.org demonstrates that electric 
utilities are important donors in political campaigns. 
5
 Allowed RORs have historically differed significantly across utilities, states and time. For instance, the highest 
allowed ROR by a state PUC during 1980 was 16.80% while the lowest was 12.50%. 
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as the basis for our measure of the utility’s nonmarket performance. This measure is also firm-
specific: each ROR applies to a single utility only. This allows us to overcome another common 
empirical problem for research on nonmarket strategy: since regulations often apply to all firms 
in an industry, it can be difficult to empirically assess the effectiveness of a firm’s individual 
strategy.  
Third, the rate review process affords the opportunity for both demand- and supply-sides of 
the political market to have an influence on final policy outcomes. On the demand-side, 
organized interest groups that are opposed to the utility’s requests – large or industrial 
consumers, residential consumer advocates, environmentalists, for example – have a right to 
participate in review hearings, to scrutinize utility expenditures and to argue against rate 
increases. Since PUCs must base their decisions on evidence presented, credible arguments from 
these groups can affect allowed RORs. On the supply-side, multiple regulatory and political 
institutions have a potential role in rate reviews. Final decisions are in the jurisdiction of state 
PUCs. However, PUCs are overseen by state legislatures that determine their budgets, that can 
conduct hearings on specific decisions and that can ultimately overturn PUCs through new 
legislation. PUC commissioners are additionally typically appointed by state governors, giving a 
further lever for state politicians to exert pressure on PUC decisions. The attractiveness of the 
political market is thus likely to be shaped by elected state politicians as well as by the regulatory 
agency.   
Sample 
 We obtained information on all rate review outcomes initiated by the population of 190 
investor-owned electric utilities during the period 1980 to 1992.6 This creates a potential sample 
                                                   
6
 These utilities represent those operating in all U.S. states except Alaska and Nebraska. We concentrate on the 
1980-1992 period since rate reviews then were initiated by utilities in response to rising costs. After 1992, as costs 
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of 2470 utility-year observations. After eliminating observations due to missing data, we are left 
with 1720 utility-year observations.7 The sample includes 491 rate reviews initiated by utilities.  
Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we use a regression model of ROR decisions. However, since rate 
reviews are not generated randomly, there is a potential sample selection problem in using 
observed rate review information. Specifically, utilities will not initiate rate reviews in 
environments if they expect the PUC will not make a favorable ruling which in turn enhances 
utility profits. If the utility does not initiate a rate review in a given period then we do not 
observe the underlying regulatory environment. Normal OLS regression techniques using only 
observed rate review data will thus yield biased estimates of the impact of our explanatory 
variables on ROR decisions. In order to produce unbiased estimates we therefore estimate the 
following sample selection model which incorporates the utility’s decision to initiate a rate 
review in the second part of our analysis (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2003):  
Utility Rate Review Initiation Decision 
 ∆pi = Χ1β1 + ε1         (1) 
 INITIATE = 1 if ∆pi > 0; = 0 otherwise      (2) 
PUC Return on Equity Decision 
 (∆ROR|INITIATE=1) = Χ2β2 + ε2       (3) 
 Correlation (ε1, ε2) = ρ 
 
In equation (1), ∆pi represents the expected change in utility profits that would occur if a rate 
review was implemented. Since the utility’s decision rule, as specified in equation (2), is to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
began to decline, PUCs began to initiate rate reviews with the aim of reducing utility rates. Since our objective is to 
examine utility strategy, we thus focus on the 1980-1992 period. 
7
 Specifically, to measure our dependent variable (change in allowed ROR) we need a baseline measure of allowed 
ROR.  Thus, we eliminate observations on utilities until they initiate their first rate review in the data.  We also 
eliminate observations if we are missing information on the allowed rate of return for a firm since this makes it 
impossible to calculate the change in allowed ROR.  The need for a baseline and the missing data on allowed ROR 
resulted in a reduction of 311 observations.  We also eliminate observations arising from missing data to measure 
the following independent variables:  Utility Revenue/PUC Budget 384 observations and Market Share 22 
observations.  Finally, we have missing data on three utilities resulting in 33 additional observations being 
eliminated. 
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initiate rate reviews only when ∆pi is greater than zero, ∆pi is a latent variable. Χ1 is a vector of 
variables including political, institutional, and socio-economic factors that affect the 
attractiveness of the political market and which thus capture utilities’ expectations that the PUC 
will increase the rate-of-return. Equation (3) estimates the change in the PUC’s allowed rate-of-
return since the utility’s last rate review, ∆ROR, conditional on observing a rate review. Χ2 is 
also a vector of variables that includes measures of the political and regulatory environment as in 
Χ1 and other factors that affect the change in the allowed rate-of-return.  
When the error terms of equations (1) and (3) are correlated, i.e. ρ is non zero, simple OLS 
estimation of equation (3) results in biased coefficients. We thus use, from the statistical software 
package STATA, the Heckman full-information maximum likelihood estimation procedure to 
correct for selection bias. This method yields unbiased estimates of β2 coefficients.  
Data and Measures 
Dependent variable 
To measure nonmarket performance we calculate the change in the Allowed Rate-of-Return 
(∆ROR) since the utility’s previous rate review. We use the change in ROR rather than the 
absolute level since this allows us to control for constant firm-level factors that influence the 
absolute ROR. We obtained the rate review data from a private firm, Regulatory Research 
Associates, that tracks PUC decisions and cross-checked for accuracy a sample of rate review 
results with data available in annual volumes of the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissions (NARUC). During the sample period, the mean ∆ROR was 0.29 percentage points 
with a standard deviation of 0.45. 
Independent variables 
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Interest group rivalry (H1): We use three variables to capture different sources of potential 
demand-side rivalry from organized interest groups. Consumer Advocate is a measure of the 
degree of residential utility consumer organization in a state. In the U.S. utilities sector 30 states 
have created consumer advocacy offices charged with the express purpose of representing 
residential utility consumer interests before state regulatory agencies and courts (Holburn and 
Vanden Bergh, 2006). Consumer advocates, with public funding and statutory power to 
participate in rate review procedures, can provide strong opposition to utility requests for rate 
increases (Holburn and Spiller, 2002). The variable Consumer Advocate equals one if a 
consumer advocacy office existed in a given state in a particular year and zero otherwise. Rivalry 
can also come from industrial consumers who, due to higher average levels of consumption than 
residential consumers, have stronger incentives to organize. Industrial Consumers, a time-
varying variable, is equal to the industrial percentage share of electricity consumption in each 
state. Data on electricity consumption by consumer sector was obtained from the Energy 
Information Administration. Finally, we use Sierra Club Membership, to capture the extent to 
which state populations participate in environmental and other non-governmental activist 
organizations. The Sierra Club is the largest environmental NGO in the U.S. Such groups have 
historically been particularly active against utilities regarding the citing of new power generation 
plants and the environmental impacts of existing facilities. To normalize membership levels 
across the states, we calculate Sierra Club Membership as the total number of members divided 
by the state population (in thousands). Annual information on state membership was provided 
directly to us by the Sierra Club. 
Political rivalry (H2): We construct two dummy variables based on the winning vote margin 
in the most recent state gubernatorial and legislative elections as a proxy for the degree of rivalry 
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among elected politicians.  For the executive branch (governors), we consider rivalry intense if 
the margin of electoral victory between the winning and second-placed candidates was less than 
5%.  In this case there is likely to be intense political competition during the next electoral cycle. 
For the legislative branch, given the importance of party control of the legislature, we consider 
rivalry intense if the margin of control by the majority party (measured by the number of seats in 
the combined upper and lower chambers) is less than 5%.  Thus, we create dummy variables for 
Governor rivalry and for Legislature rivalry which are equal to one if rivalry is intense and zero 
otherwise. We use dummy rather than continuous variables since the underlying distributions of 
governor vote and legislature party majorities are not normal but highly skewed. We collected 
this information from annual volumes of The Book of the States. 
Regulatory agency resource base (H3): PUCs with greater resources will be less dependent 
on the information provided by the utility in making their decisions. Again, we use several 
measures. Our first, PUC Budget per state capita, is a measure of financial resources.  Second, 
we construct a measure of PUC commissioner experience since experience may partially 
substitute for financial resources: Average tenure commissioners is equal to the sum of each 
commissioner’s tenure in years divided by the total number of commissioners on the PUC. We 
expect that more experienced commissioners will have better information and insights regarding 
utility rate review requests. We obtained annual information on PUC budgets and the identities 
of PUC commissioners from annual reports of the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners, annual volumes of The Book of the States and the websites of individual PUCs. 
Third, we allow for PUC resources to vary relative to individual utilities as well as in an absolute 
sense; a PUC with a small budget will be less dependent on the utility if the utility itself has a 
minimal level of resources. Hence, Utility Revenue / PUC Budget is the dollar value of utility 
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electricity revenues within a state divided by the PUC budget in each year. Information on utility 
revenues was gathered from FERC filings available through the Energy Information 
Administration. 
Firm’s experience with policy-makers (H4): To capture a utility’s experience in dealing with 
policy-makers, we rely on two related measures. In the selection equation we create Cumulative 
rate reviews by utility which is equal to the total number of rate reviews the utility has 
experienced at a given time. In the regression equation we create Recent rate review which is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the utility has experienced a rate review in the previous three 
years and zero otherwise. We differentiate between initiation of rate reviews and performance in 
the review since we anticipate that total experience in a variety of regulatory settings would 
affect the utility’s decision to initiate. Their performance in the rate review, however, will be 
more closely related to their recent experience since the characteristics of the regulatory 
environment changes over time. 
Other firms’ experiences with policy-makers (H5): Other firms initiating rate reviews is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if other utilities in the state initiated rate reviews with the 
PUC in the previous year and zero otherwise. The variable captures a potential utility learning 
effect from observing other utilities’ experience with the PUC. 
Control variables 
We control for a number of factors that may affect a utility’s performance in the rate review 
process as well as the decision to initiate a rate review. Interest rates on treasury securities enter 
into a PUC’s decision on the allowed ROR since these are a benchmark to help measure the cost 
of capital. Change in interest rate, measured in percentage points, is the difference between the 
interest rate on ten year Treasury bills at a given time minus the interest rate at the time of the 
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last rate review. Change in average fuel cost is the percentage change in a utility’s average fuel 
costs (on a per Btu basis) since the last rate review, and is driven mainly by external market 
forces. Increases in the cost of utilities’ fuel purchases, as occurred during the early 1980s, 
directly reduce utility profits, thereby increasing the probability that utilities will initiate rate 
reviews8. In the selection equation, we also control for the absolute level of fuel costs - since 
absolute costs are inversely related to profits we expect a positive relationship between absolute 
costs and the probability that utilities initiate. We measure average fuel cost as the average price 
of fuel per Btu purchased by electric utilities within a state. Fuel cost data is published by the 
Energy Information Administration. To control for varying economic conditions across the 
states, we include a measure of the Change in per capita income (lagged one year) which is 
equal to the annual percentage change in per capita income in the state; voter pressure on utility 
rates may be inversely correlated with recent economic growth trends. We gathered this data 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
We include additional political and institutional variables that may influence the weight that 
PUCs put on utility versus consumer interests in their ROR decisions. Elected PUC is a dummy 
variable equal to one in states where PUC commissioners are elected and zero otherwise. PUC 
commissioners are elected by the voting population in 10 states and are appointed by the 
governor in other states. Prior research suggests that elected PUCs place greater weight on 
consumer welfare (Besley and Coate, 2003). Details on commissioner selection were obtained 
from the Book of the States. Similarly, the variable Republican governor and legislature equals 
one if there is unified Republican control of the branches of state government, and zero 
                                                   
8
 Some states adopted automatic fuel adjustment clauses (FACs) during the 1980s that allowed utilities to pass 
through fuel costs without requiring a formal rate review. However, since such clauses rarely allowed utilities to 
pass through 100 percent of the cost increases, fuel cost-triggered rate reviews were not completely eliminated. 
24 
 
otherwise. This captures the potential impact of ideological factors (as proxied by political party) 
on regulatory policy and utility strategy.   
Finally, we also measure the Market Share for a utility as the total megawatt hours (MWh) of 
electricity provided by the utility divided the total MWh provided by all utilities in the state. If a 
utility is a major player within a PUC’s jurisdiction, then that utility’s information is likely to be 
more valuable to the PUC relative to smaller utilities. Market share thus measures the influence 
of the utility relative to other utilities.   
A summary of the variables and descriptive statistics can be found in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 
provides statistics for variables included in the full sample of utility-year observations used in the 
rate review initiation (selection) model while Table 2 provides statistics for variables included in 
the ∆ROR (regression) model.   
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
RESULTS 
We begin by discussing the results of the selection-corrected ∆ROR regression model. Table 
3 shows the results of our model estimated with state fixed effects. The statistically significant 
Mills ratio coefficient supports our empirical approach: we can reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% level of confidence that there is no sample selection problem. With only one choice for 
utilities (initiate a rate review or not), the positive coefficient on the Mills ratio implies that there 
exists a positive correlation between the decision to initiate – and therefore to engage in a 
nonmarket strategy to change an existing regulation – and the performance of the utility in the 
rate proceedings (Dolton and Makepeace, 1987). In other words, we find good evidence that 
utilities use the rate review initiation process strategically. Among control variables, it is also 
worth noting that Change in interest rate and Change in per capita income are significant and 
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positive. As expected, though not directly related to the political markets logic, changes in the 
cost of financing should have an impact on the ∆ROR. Similarly, annual fluctuations in state 
economic conditions are positively correlated with increases in utilities’ allowed rates-of-return.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Turning to our key variables, we find good statistical support overall for our hypotheses. 
First, regarding demand-side rivalry (H1), the coefficient on Sierra club membership is negative 
and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that lower levels of rivalry lead to positive 
changes in the ROR for the utility.  Note however that, due to the non-linearity of the selection 
effect, we cannot interpret the coefficients as straight marginal effects.  We thus include Table 4 
to present selection-corrected marginal effects for each of the statistically significant variables. A 
marginal decrease in demand-side rivalry, as measured by Sierra club membership is expected to 
increase the ROR by 6 basis points. The degree of rivalry generated by activists, then, appears to 
be an important factor in the ability of utilities to achieve favorable PUC decisions. This result is 
in line with previous literature, which suggests that activists constitute a particularly difficult 
threat to handle for firm (Bonardi and Keim, 2005). Our other demand-side rivalry variables, 
however, do not display significant coefficients. This may be due to measurement challenges. 
The Consumer Advocate dummy variable, for instance, may be too coarse to capture the strength 
of consumer opposition. More fine-grained data such as the budget of the consumer advocate 
organization were unavailable. A potential explanation for the lack of significance on Industry is 
that powerful industrial consumers did not in fact compete against utilities on ROR decisions – 
perhaps in return for utility support on other policy dimensions, such as the rate structure, where 
industrial consumers compete against residential consumers.  
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The results suggest also that rivalry among politicians shapes PUC decisions, which provides 
support for H2. The coefficient on Legislature rivalry is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level when we include state fixed effects in the model. On the margin, when rivalry 
among the legislature becomes intense, the utility can expect to benefit from an 18 basis point 
increase in the ROR. Interestingly, when we computed some robustness checks by using 
alternative constructions of the dummy variable with different cut-off points, we found that the 
impact of legislative rivalry was even larger (and significant) when narrowing down the cut-off 
point. With a 2% cut-off point, for instance, the estimated coefficient in the regression doubles.9 
On the other hand, with a cut-off of 20%, the coefficient is correctly signed but not significant. 
This provides support for the idea that very strong levels of political rivalry generate especially 
positive situations for firms’ nonmarket strategies.   
Rivalry among elected political candidates thus appears to create an opportunity for utilities, 
a particularly well organized interest group, to ‘purchase’ regulatory policies (i.e. higher allowed 
RORs) - through additional campaign contributions, grassroots mobilization or other politically 
valuable resource transfers. Legislatures have an ability to induce the PUC to cooperate on rate 
review decisions by threatening budget cuts or by supporting legislative proposals that constrain 
PUC authority. We do not find any evidence, however, that rivalry among gubernatorial 
candidates – Governor rivalry – influences PUC decisions. This may reflect the weaker ability of 
the appointments process, which is largely the preserve of governors, to immediately impact 
PUC commissioner decisions. 
                                                   
9
 A Shapiro-Francia test on a continuous measure of the Legrivalry variable also demonstrates that it is not normally 
distributed. 
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Beyond rivalry factors, we observe that regulatory agency resource dependence affects the 
ability of firms to achieve preferred policy rulings. We find that both financial and experience 
PUC resource measures are important (H3). With the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on PUC budget, utilities’ RORs are negatively affected as regulator’s financial 
resources increase. Similarly, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on Average 
tenure commissioners supports the contention that greater PUC experience is detrimental to 
utility performance. The economic significance of these effects, however, appears to be less 
important than rivalry. Marginally increasing PUC budget and Average tenure commissioners 
reduces the ROR by 2 and 1 basis points respectively.  
Turning now to the firm’s experience with policy-makers (H4), the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on Recent rate review provides strong evidence that utilities with recent 
rate review experience tend to perform better in subsequent rate reviews. At the margin, 
increasing the value of Recent rate review increases the utility’s ROR by 22 basis points. On the 
other hand, we do not find support for Hypothesis 5 which argues that firms can learn by 
observing others’ past nonmarket interactions. 
Among the remaining control variables, Republican governor and legislature, Elected PUC, 
Market share and Change in Average Fuel Cost are signed as expected but not significant. We 
experimented with other control variables that might have affected the ROR such as utility 
operating efficiency and the concentration of utilities within a state, but did not find evidence of 
an impact. 
Our empirical specification also generates insights into the reasons why firms proactively 
request a change in regulatory policy. Table 5 presents the selection results, where the dependent 
variable is whether or not the utility initiated a rate review. Table 6 presents the marginal effect 
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of each statistically significant variable on the probability that the utility initiates a rate review. 
73% of the cases are correctly classified by the full model presented in Table 5, suggesting this 
model performs well in capturing the initiation dimension of the utilities’ nonmarket strategy.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
In general, the results on individual initiation model variables display a strong consistency 
with the pattern of results in the ∆ROR model. Increased demand-side rivalry with other interest 
groups appears to dampen the incentives of utilities to initiate rate proceedings with the state 
PUC. As in the ∆ROR model, Sierra club membership is significant and negative, but this time 
Consumer advocate displays a similar result. At the margin, Sierra club membership and the 
presence of a Consumer advocate reduce the probability that the utility initiates by nearly 5% 
and 8% respectively. Rivalry created by other demanders of public policy therefore seems to be 
an important factor in the utility’s analysis of its nonmarket environment and in its decision to 
implement a nonmarket strategy.  
Likewise, the negative and statistically significant coefficients on PUC budget and Average 
tenure commissioners each suggest that as the regulator’s dependence on the firm for 
informational resources declines, the attractiveness of the political market for the utility also 
falls. At the margin, as PUC budget increases and as Average tenure commissioners increases, 
the probability of the utility initiating a rate review declines by about 3% and 1% respectively. 
These results are consistent with H1 and H3. We do not obtain statistical significance, however, 
on the political rivalry variables (H2).  
Firm-level variables also perform well in the rate review initiation model. As utilities 
accumulate knowledge and experience about the rate review process, as measured by Cumulative 
29 
 
rate reviews by the utility, the probability of initiating a review increases by 6%. Additionally, 
there is evidence of a spillover effect from other utilities: the variable Other firms initiating rate 
reviews, statistically significant at the 1% level, is estimated to increase the likelihood of a utility 
triggering a rate review by nearly 13%. This result is similar to that of Hersch and McDougall 
(2000), who found that in the U.S. automobile industry the major firms’ levels of political 
activity were related to the political activities of their rivals.  
Similarly, as Market share increases, the probability that the utility initiates a regulatory 
review increases by nearly 20%. This result is consistent with previous studies which have found 
that firm size is a determinant of the decision to engage in a nonmarket strategy (Masters and 
Keim, 1985; Munger, 1988; Schuler, 1996; Zardkoohi, 1985).  
Finally, control variables are generally significant and signed as expected.  
DISCUSSION 
This paper sets out to develop and test a model of what determines the performance of a 
firm’s nonmarket strategy in the context of a specific regulatory or political issue. Building on 
the political markets framework, according to which public policies arise from the interaction of 
demanders and suppliers of such policies, we argue that nonmarket performance is influenced 
both by the characteristics of the firm’s regulatory/political environment and by the internal 
capabilities the firm has developed over time. More precisely, we hypothesized - and found 
empirical support in the context of U.S. electric utilities - that the rivalry created by competing 
demanders of public policies (auch as environmental activists), as well as the resources of the 
regulatory agency involved, had a negative impact on the firm’s ability to obtain regulatory 
approval for higher profit levels. On the other hand, we found that the rivalry among elected 
politicians supervising policy implementation had a positive impact on regulatory rulings 
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favorable towards the firm. Last, we found that the firm’s previous experience with regulators 
through making prior regulatory filings played an important role in explaining the performance 
of its nonmarket strategy.  
We make several contributions to the existing literature on nonmarket strategies. First, we 
provide a general model of firms’ nonmarket performance that integrates different aspects 
examined in previous studies, including the attractiveness of political markets and firms’ 
nonmarket capabilities. The literature so far has remained scattered, with little focus on 
nonmarket performance and with disparate theoretical perspectives that lack a unifying approach. 
Lord (2000), for instance, presents the results of an interesting survey of U.S. companies of the 
impact of various nonmarket activities – electoral campaign contributions, informational 
lobbying, advocacy advertising, constituency building – but does not provide any insights about 
the factors that affect their performance. We believe that the concept of political markets has the 
potential to provide such an integrative framework. As argued in this paper, elements from 
economics, from the resource-based view of the firm and from resource-dependence theory can 
be integrated into the framework to provide a comprehensive view of nonmarket performance, as 
well as a basis for future research. The framework, by delineating the conditions under which 
nonmarket strategies are likely to be effective, also provides guidelines for managers when 
assessing whether to implement such strategies. 
The second major contribution of our paper is to provide unique empirical evidence that is 
supportive of the theoretical validity of the political markets framework and of its implications 
for nonmarket strategy performance. The data requirements in assessing performance are 
challenging. Researchers must obtain data relating to (1) an identifiable, specific political or 
regulatory issue, (2) the implementation of the firm’s nonmarket strategy and (3) a measure of 
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the policy outcome. Most existing studies of nonmarket strategy usually employ data on aspects 
(1) and (2) only, which precludes investigation of performance issues (see, for example, Schuler, 
1996 and Lenway & Rehbein, 1991). Our data on electric utility rate reviews provides good 
information on (1) – the utility’s regulated level of profitability – and (3) – the agency’s final 
policy decision on the allowed rate of financial return. Our data on (2) – a dichotomous measure 
of whether the utility filed a formal request for policy review – is less fine-grained than we 
would ideally prefer in measuring the implementation of a nonmarket strategy. It indicates the 
utility’s engagement in various nonmarket activities such as the provision of information to the 
regulatory agency and participation in public hearings; but it does not allow us to identify the 
extent of the utility’s investment in these activities. While we recognize that this is a shortcoming 
of our study, the positive findings in the empirical model of the utility’s initiation decision 
suggest it is nonetheless a reasonable strategy indicator. 
A related limitation is that we are unable to examine in more detail the design of utilities’ 
nonmarket strategies outside regulatory settings (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Schuler et al., 
2002); detailed data on utility campaign contributions, lobbying or mobilization of grassroots 
support for legislators are unfortunately not available for our sample. We do know, however, 
from aggregate state-level campaign contribution data (available from www.followthemoney.org) 
that electric utilities are significant contributors to political candidates for state government 
offices. This suggests that future research which incorporates multiple dimensions of firm 
nonmarket strategy is warranted. 
Third, within the political markets framework we provide a better understanding of the 
impact on a firm’s nonmarket performance of regulatory agencies responsible for policy 
implementation. Firms in a wide variety of industries are subject to industry-specific agency 
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rule-making, including agriculture, pharmaceuticals and utilities. Many other firms are subject to 
functional regulations that cross industry borders, such as workplace safety, labor standards and 
environmental impact. An important step in our hypothesis development is depicting regulatory 
agency decision-making in general in the context of the broader institutional environment, 
including courts and legislatures that have the ability to reverse errant agency actions. Agencies 
operate under different incentives and constraints than elected politicians. We argue specifically 
that regulatory agencies are constrained in their decisions by procedural requirements: agencies 
need resources to obtain information and to justify their rulings in order to avoid judicial 
override - and we find strong evidence that better funded, more experienced agencies are better 
positioned to counter the policy changes that firms claim are required.  
Together with the results on political rivalry, our findings suggest that the ability of firms to 
gain favorable policy rulings in regulatory arenas – as compared to legislative arenas – is 
complex, requiring firms to operate in multiple institutional environments. In order to be 
successful in regulatory arenas, firms may additionally need to gain the support of the legislative 
and executive bodies that monitor agency decisions in order to prevent subsequent ‘punishment’ 
of the agency. Alternatively, firms may be able to use these political channels strategically to 
indirectly pressure agencies to implement favorable rulings (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2004). 
Indeed, we find evidence consistent with this type of behavior in the positive statistical 
relationship between political rivalry and favorable agency decisions.  
Our fourth contribution is to provide new empirical results consistent with the notion that 
firms are able to develop internal capabilities that improve their nonmarket performance. 
Existing research finds that the prior experience of firms’ board members in political institutions 
is associated with better overall firm performance (Hillman et al, 1999). In extending the 
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nonmarket capabilities literature we argue that repeated interactions between firms and policy-
makers are likely to be an important mechanism for developing nonmarket capabilities since they 
provide an opportunity for firms to learn from experience and to establish organizational 
routines; and, critically, they enable firms to establish a reputation for credibility with 
government actors – essential for overcoming the high transaction costs of exchange in political 
markets. While we find that firms with greater experience in interacting with regulatory agencies 
through prior rate reviews did indeed achieve better policy outcomes, we did not find evidence 
that firms achieved similar results by observing the experiences of other firms, implying that 
nonmarket capabilities are not easily imitated (Keim and Baysinger, 1988). It is interesting to 
note, however, that utilities were more likely to initiate rate reviews when other utilities also 
initiated. This is consistent with Oliver’s (1991) proposition that regulated firms can obtain a 
degree of legitimacy by conforming to institutional processes.  
While other types of capabilities have been extensively studied elsewhere (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1994; Ethiraj et al, 2005; Makadok and Walker, 2000; Silverman, 1999), as far as we 
know, this is one of the first empirical studies to directly attempt to measure nonmarket 
capabilities. Our study also raises an interesting question: if firms learn from their own 
experiences in a particular institutional environment, can they re-deploy these nonmarket 
capabilities to other institutional settings? We tentatively explored this issue using our data by 
considering parent company experience for those utilities that belonged to holding company 
organizations. Our initial results (unreported here) suggest that a holding company’s rate review 
experience in other states was correlated with improved rate review outcomes in the focal state, 
implying that firms may learn some generic lessons about interacting with policy-makers 
through their experiences in different jurisdictions. We believe this is a promising avenue for 
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future research, as are broader questions related to the impact, and source, of firm capabilities in 
achieving more favorable policy outcomes.  
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Although we believe our results are encouraging there are a number of other theoretical and 
empirical limitations in our analysis that call for further research on the topic of nonmarket 
strategy performance. One potential shortcoming is that while we have developed generic 
hypotheses, we have tested them in the context of a single industry, raising questions about the 
generalizability of our findings to other settings. We might expect to find that the role of firm 
nonmarket capabilities, for instance, is less significant in industries that are less heavily regulated 
than the utilities sector where firm-regulator interactions are relatively frequent. Utilities also 
have a unique ability to initiate policy change through the rate review process; without such 
rights, firms in other industries may find it more difficult to gain access to policy-makers and to 
establish political markets, making political strategies less effective. A further characteristic of 
our research design is that we measure firm-level regulatory policy outcomes and firm-level 
strategies which seek the private benefits of regulation. While we regard this as a strength of our 
analysis in identifying performance drivers, it does mean that we do not explore collective action 
problems within an industry. If regulations provide public rather than private benefits to firms 
within an industry, the costs of organizing collective action will, all else equal, reduce nonmarket 
strategy performance. 
From a theoretical perspective, we do not distinguish between different types of nonmarket 
strategy in our hypotheses. Different types of strategy are likely to perform differentially in 
various environments (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). For instance, the ways in which firms attempt to 
mitigate interest group competition will not be the same as the methods by which firms gain the 
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support of elected legislators. The incentives and objectives of these two groups vary, and firms 
will adopt their nonmarket tactics accordingly. There is thus scope for future work to consider a 
more fine-grained measure of nonmarket strategy and to consider the demand and supply-side 
conditions in which each type will be more or less effective. Another potential route for 
developing the political markets framework is to examine the interactions between and within 
demand and supply-side factors – does interest group competition, for example, have a more 
powerful effect when political rivalry is also strong? Or how does the impact of regulatory 
expertise depend on political rivalry? We believe that addressing these types of questions would 
provide important additional theoretical insights into the attractiveness of political markets.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite these and other limitations, our study offers new insights into the factors that affect 
the ability of firms to succeed when they engage in nonmarket strategies. In particular, we argue 
that both the external environment, which we conceptualize as a political market involving 
demanders and suppliers of public policies, and the internal characteristics of firms both matter 
significantly in explaining nonmarket performance. Using data from U.S. electric utilities, we 
find good empirical support for this thesis even though much work remains to be done. 
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 Table 3: Heckman Selection-Corrected Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Change in Allowed Return on Equity since last Rate Review 
 
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient 
H1: Interest Group Rivalry Sierra Club membership -0.38** (0.175) 
 Consumer advocate 0.294 (0.305) 
 Industrial consumers -0.02 (2.675) 
 
 
 
H2: Political Rivalry Legislature rivalry 0.566** (0.279) 
 Governor rivalry -0.09 (0.128) 
 
  
H3: Regulatory Agency Resources PUC budget -0.20* (0.119) 
 Average tenure commissioners -0.08** (0.042) 
 Utility revenue/PUC budget 0.000 (0.000) 
 
  
H4: Firm’s experience Recent Rate Review  0.820*** (0.164) 
 
  
H5: Other firms’ experience Other firms initiating reviews -0.03 (0.147) 
 
  
Control Variables Change in per capita income 8.906*** (2.007) 
 Change in interest rate  0.231*** (0.039) 
 Change in average fuel cost 0.015*** (0.003) 
 Market share 0.062 (0.262) 
 Republican governor and legislature 0.302 (0.247) 
 Elected PUC -0.07 (0.948) 
 Constant -1.37 (1.069) 
 Mills ratio 0.364*** (0.127) 
 
  
 State Dummies Yes 
 N 491 
 Log pseudo-likelihood -1577.923 
*    p < .10 
**  p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects from Heckman Selection-Corrected Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Change in Allowed Return on Equity since last Rate Review 
 
Statistically Significant Variable Marginal Effects* 
Sierra Club membership (H1) -0.06 
Legislature rivalry (H2) 0.18 
PUC budget (H3) -0.02 
Average tenure commissioners (H3) -0.01 
Recent Rate Review (H4) 0.22 
Change in per capita income 0.37 
Change in interest rate  0.08 
Change in average fuel cost 0.002 
  
*Marginal effects calculated at the mean of each continuous independent 
variable and for discrete changes in each dummy variable.  We present the 
marginal effects for the model which includes state dummy variables. 
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Table 5: Heckman Selection Results 
Dependent Variable: Utility Initiation of Rate Review 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Sierra Club membership -0.13*** (0.043) 
Consumer advocate -0.24*** (0.088) 
Industrial consumers -0.29 (0.463) 
  
Legislature rivalry -0.19 (0.134) 
Governor rivalry 0.097 (0.087) 
  
PUC budget -0.09*** (0.032) 
Average tenure commissioners -0.03** (0.018) 
Utility revenue/PUC budget -0.00 (0.000) 
  
Cumulative rate reviews by utility 0.190*** (0.021) 
  
Other firms initiating rate reviews 0.436*** (0.090) 
  
Change in per capita income 6.485*** (1.239) 
Change in interest rate  -0.06*** (0.022) 
Change in average fuel cost 0.006*** (0.002) 
Market share 0.599*** (0.230) 
Republican governor and legislature -0.02 (0.131) 
Average fuel cost 0.142*** (0.061) 
Elected PUC -0.28** (0.145) 
Constant -1.69*** (0.296) 
  
State Dummies in Regression Yes 
Wald test of independent equations (χ2(1)) 9.05 
N 1,720 
Reviews correctly classified by model 73% 
*    p < .10 
**  p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: Marginal Effects from Selection Results 
Dependent Variable: Utility Initiation of Rate Review 
 
Statistically Significant Variable Marginal Effects* 
Consumer advocate -0.08 
Sierra club membership -0.05 
PUC budget -0.03 
Average tenure commissioners -0.01 
Cumulative rate reviews by utility  0.06 
Other firms initiating rate reviews  0.13 
Elected PUC -0.09 
Market share of utility  0.20 
Change in interest rate -0.02 
Change in average fuel cost 0.002 
Average fuel cost 0.05 
  
*Marginal effects calculated at the mean of each continuous independent 
variable and for discrete changes in each dummy variable.  We present the 
marginal effects for the model which includes state dummy variables. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Variables and Summary Statistics (Rate Review Initiation Estimation) 
 
Variable Mean St.Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Rate Review (Dependent Variable) 0.29 0.45 1.00              
2. Consumer advocate 0.59 0.49 -0.01 1.00             
3. Industrial Consumers 0.27 0.08 -0.02 -0.11 1.00            
4. Sierra Club Membership  1.50 1.07 -0.02 -0.12 -0.20 1.00           
5. Governor rivalry 0.22 0.41 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.12 1.00          
6. Legislative rivalry  0.10 0.30 -0.04 0.10 0.15 -0.04 0.16 1.00         
7. PUC Budget 2.00 1.47 -0.10 -0.05 -0.14 0.12 0.05 0.07 1.00        
8. Elected PUC 0.14 0.35 -0.10 -0.27 -0.07 -0.28 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 1.00       
9. Utility revenue/PUC Budget 105.38 130.91 0.05 0.00 0.14 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.31 0.09 1.00      
10. Cumulative rate reviews 3.82 1.96 0.16 0.16 -0.17 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.11 -0.16 0.07 1.00     
11. Market share 0.29 0.26 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.13 0.25 0.60 0.14 1.00    
12. Change in interest rate -1.33 1.89 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.10 0.06 0.22 0.01 1.00   
13. Average tenure commissioners 3.63 2.59 -0.08 -0.15 -0.06 -0.17 -0.03 0.00 0.21 0.45 0.00 0.06 0.12 -0.05 1.00  
14. Change in average fuel cost -4.44 18.06 0.06 -0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.36 -0.07 1.00 
15. Average fuel cost 1.68 0.81 0.09 -0.03 -0.07 0.14 0.16 -0.15 -0.27 -0.07 0.12 -0.17 -0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.10 
16. Republican governor and legislature 0.10 0.30 -0.02 -0.11 0.06 -0.16 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.14 -0.01 -0.15 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 
17. Change in per capita income 0.06 0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.05 -0.21 0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.19 
18. Other firms initiating reviews 0.69 0.46 0.14 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.20 -0.25 -0.12 -0.04 -0.31 0.09 -0.19 -0.03 
N = 1720 
   
1 
 1 
 
Table 2: Variables and Summary Statistics (∆ROR Estimation) 
 
Variable Mean St.Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. ∆ROE (Dependent Variable) -0.47 1.34 1.00               
2. Consumer advocate 0.58 0.49 -0.08 1.00              
3. Industrial Consumers 0.27 0.08 0.09 -0.13 1.00             
4. Sierra Club Membership  1.46 1.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.22 1.00            
5. Governor rivalry 0.23 0.42 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.08 1.00           
6. Legislative rivalry  0.08 0.27 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.22 1.00          
7. PUC Budget 1.78 1.23 -0.19 -0.11 -0.18 0.16 -0.03 0.01 1.00         
8. Elected PUC 0.09 0.28 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.21 -0.04 -0.01 0.15 1.00        
9. Utility revenue/PUC Budget 116.26 135.45 0.04 -0.03 0.20 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.33 0.07 1.00       
10. Recent rate review  0.86 0.35 0.46 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.19 -0.06 0.02 1.00      
11. Market share 0.31 0.25 0.00 -0.07 0.10 0.05 -0.15 0.01 0.16 0.25 0.59 -0.01 1.00     
12. Change in interest rate -1.20 1.81 0.55 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 0.36 0.00 1.00    
13. Average tenure commissioners 3.32 2.60 -0.13 0.04 -0.16 -0.12 0.08 -0.06 0.29 0.36 -0.04 -0.09 0.08 -0.13 1.00   
14. Change in average fuel cost -2.63 16.60 0.43 -0.18 0.18 -0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.05 0.43 -0.12 1.00  
15. Republican governor and legislature 0.09 0.29 0.04 -0.10 0.16 -0.14 0.04 0.27 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 0.01 1.00
16. Change in per capita income 0.07 0.03 0.43 -0.08 0.01 -0.17 0.13 0.04 -0.17 0.04 0.08 0.21 -0.02 0.30 0.01 0.35 0.15
17. Other firms initiating reviews 0.79 0.40 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.02 -0.20 -0.15 -0.13 0.27 -0.31 0.12 -0.15 0.04 0.02
N = 491 
 
 
